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agents profited from its monopolistic position. It also shows that taxation increased the regional welfare and allowed the government to support two related activities: telegraphs and shipping.
The thesis proves that violence and coercion were not necessary features of rubber production, as argued by much of the literature. Through a game theoretic approach, the thesis demonstrates conditions under which production could have occurred without exploitation. In a context of high price inelasticity of demand and rising prices, production was driven by market forces. Inelasticity of demand was indeed one of the main features of the rubber boom. It shaped production, bargaining power between different nodes of the chain and competition within them, defining the distribution of profits along the rubber chain.
The thesis examines how institutions and geography explain the development of the rubber chain in the Brazilian Amazon from 1870 to 1910. For the analysis, a new theoretical framework is built, which is general enough to be applied to other commodities as well. The departure point was general trade theory that provides two basic explanations for patterns of trade: technology and endowments. However, these standard trade models usually consider trade in isolation from investment, finance, or other relations between traders. It was thus necessary to combine these features as well as institutions and geography in order to generate a more suitable framework for the analysis of commodity chains and of the rubber chain in particular. A more quantitative-driven analysis from macroeconomic data gave further support to inferences taken from microeconomic behavior. From this analysis of the rubber chain, contributions to commodity chain literature and world, Brazilian, and Amazonian economic history are made.
There are two levels of analysis. The thesis analyzes interactions that happened within the nodes of the chain as well as interactions between different nodes of the chain. In the within-node analysis, competition among agents located in the same node is examined. In the between-node analysis, no predefined power structure is imposed ad hoc: indeed, the location of the nodes did not imply any power structure along the chain, location being merely the result of a historical process that, in turn, was a consequence of technology and endowment factors as well as institutions. Power between nodes of the chain was understood under a game theoretical framework. This was in fact one of the most innovative theoretical concepts developed in the thesis.
The organization of the thesis followed the stylized chain as presented in Chapter 1. The thesis began by analyzing the rubber manu-facturing industry. In a Ricardian fashion, at first, the proximity to rubber sources and the dexterity in the manipulation of rubber provided comparative advantage to indigenous rubber manufactures. However, the discovery of the vulcanization process undermined the superior quality of indigenous production and made possible the centralization of rubber manufacture in factories: vulcanization shifted comparative advantage in rubber manufacturing toward Britain and the U.S.A. From then on, the pattern of trade became mainly understood as a result of Hecksher-Ohlin forces: Brazil specialized in the production of crude rubber due to the relative abundance of rubber trees in the Brazilian Amazon, whereas Britain and the U.S.A. specialized in the production of rubber manufactures due to the relative abundance of capital, which became a requisite for larger rubber concerns. Therefore, from the 1860s onwards, Britain and the U.S.A. deepened their industrial position in rubber manufacturing with a similar technology being used on both sides of the Atlantic.
Even though standard trade models explain the geography of rubber trade (and by consequence the first node of the rubber chain, namely, the rubber manufacturing industry), there were other forces at play. Institutions were, undoubtedly, very important. Formal institutions, notably patent legislation, influenced and shaped the market structure of the rubber manufacturing industry. Patents encouraged a process of amalgamations in Britain and the U.S.A., even though the rubber industry remained quite competitive on both sides of the Atlantic. This competition at the manufacturing level resounded along the chain, translating into a struggle for securing a steady and reliable source of crude rubber, the main input in the industry. The thesis enhances the analysis of the rubber chain by acknowledging that trade is not carried out under neoclassical assumptions: the relationship between parties to trade and the role of investment and finance was instrumental in understanding the actual pattern of the rubber trade that emerged. Given its scarcity, crude rubber was very expensive, and access to resources thus became strategic to determine or influence profitability at the manufacturing level, turning the manufacturing node of the rubber chain into something very different from the ideal global commodity chain (GCC) or "Wallersteinian" core-node type. True, the British rubber industry was better positioned compared to its American counterpart: since British traders were importing more crude rubber than the British industry needed, they were able to pass through the burden of crude rubber scarcity to American buyers since the latter were unable to meet all their demand from primary sources. Furthermore, there was also scope for exporters placed in Brazil to extract monopoly rents especially from American buyers who registered a more inelastic demand for their product when compared to British demand for Brazilian crude rubber (−1.11 for the U.S.A. against −1.54 for the Britain). Inelasticity of demand for rubber was indeed one of the main features of this commodity chain from 1870 to 1910, a feature that actually shaped the market structure in several different nodes of the chain, affected the bargain position of players located in different nodes, and defined the division of profits along the chain. Inelasticity of demand was indeed the main determinant of the pattern of British and American investments in rubber production and trade. The scarcity of crude rubber led to a struggle along the rubber chain for a steady supply of that raw product: the rubber manufacturing industry needed to break the dependence upon an unreliable raw product which defined its prices and the ultimate level of its own production.
The consequent geography of trade impacted the quality of the raw material the industrial countries (especially Britain and the U.S.A.) were acquiring. As crude rubber was not a homogeneous commodity, the possibilities of production became defined by the quality of the crude rubber imported. In a neoclassical market, prices would have cleared the market: those in need of the best rubber quality could always pay the market price and get the needed amount of the product. However, trade was in fact the result of a constellation of institutions: it was usually hidden behind forward long-term contracts and followed colonial lines. First, the thesis stressed the fact that the rubber market was far from comprising anonymous and atomized agents transacting with one another. Traders and manufacturers usually established long-lasting connections that impacted on the way they traded: it was not easy to bypass this informal arrangement and the U.S. buyers early understood it. Secondly, traders preferred to establish commercial activities in areas under the jurisdiction of their native countries. This happened sometimes because these traders were prevented from establishing themselves in another country's colonies. Even when jurisdiction was not an issue, the rubber trade followed their country's informal areas of influence, as it happened in the relationship between Mexico and the U.S.A. Thirdly, geographical and economic distances (first-and second-nature geographical aspects) further influenced and shaped the pattern of the rubber trade.
In regard to the main rubber producer, the Brazilian Amazon was not a formal or informal colony of either the U.S.A. or Britain. The ensuing struggle between American and British buyers to obtain a competitive edge by securing a more stable and reliable access to Brazilian rubber reserves may have prevented concerted action among rubber importers, giving some room for maneuver to rubber exporters placed in producing regions, notably in Brazil. Such seemed to be the case of the Brazilian/Portuguese export house, J.
H.Andresen. The relationship between this company and its main buyer (a British rubber import house) resembled a usual trade relationship in which both companies benefited, and the thesis further indicated that if any company exercised market power, it was probably the Brazilian/Portuguese export house. Export houses in Brazil were not free to act as monopolists or oligopolists in the rubber market though. In the Brazilian supply chain, there was a counteracting force that prevented players from extracting monopoly rents fully: the scarcity of laborers. However, the thesis rejects the assumption that production was only possible due to the creation of an exploitative labor system. It does not deny that debt enslavement and coercion were present in the Brazilian Amazon, but it rejects the idea that it was a necessary feature of rubber production. In this regard, the thesis advances a game theoretic model that unveils the bargain positions of laborers and rubber estate owners. Instead of assuming any predefined power relationship between these transacting agents, the game simplifies the motivations of both parties into a general framework that is further constrained by the institutions existent and created in the Brazilian Amazon. The game suggests that there were several possible scenarios in which production could have been enforced according to the roles of four main variables: tapper's horizon of planning, reward from cheating, expected income from an alternative employment, and the implicit and explicit prices paid for rubber produced. The game was further applied to the analysis of power between the other nodes of the rubber chain within the Brazilian Amazon. The rubber chain became then very intricate, and the relations of power ceased to necessarily follow a vertical one in which every forward node is able to exploit the node immediately beneath it, as the GCC approach usually assumes. Yet, it was possible that rubber exporters were even better positioned to extract monopoly rents due to their knowledge of the rubber market and the degree of oligopolization of their activities, but they did not necessarily do so. Not least because it was easier to enforce rubber production under a scenario of constant production expansion and of high inelasticity of demand, like the one that prevailed from 1870 to 1910. Under this scenario, all factors of production could have been properly remunerated.
If it is not certain that any particular node of the rubber chain was extracting monopoly rents in full, the government was certainly profiting from the monopolistic position the Amazonian region had in rubber markets. The literature on Brazilian rubber has indeed neglected the fact that the government could have been able to ensure the monopoly outcome even under a high degree of competition among Brazilian rubber exporters and under a high inelasticity of sup-ply. The government possessed several mechanisms to pursue this goal: nationalization of rubber production, licensing scheme, stockpiling, export tariffs, and import tariffs over goods that affect the rubber cost structure. It is argued here that export tariff and import tariff were the main instruments actually used by the government, but the welfare analysis focused on the export tariff. Under reasonable assumptions, results here suggest that the optimum export tariff could have ranged between 96.2% and 126.5%, but the government levied only 16.6% on average in the years for which data were available . Had the government imposed the optimum export tariff, welfare could have been increased as much as £341,444 per year from 1891 to 1910, equivalent to 1.89% of Amazonian GDP in the period. This welfare would have been generated on top of 1.80% that had already been generated by the government when it set the export tariff at 18.9% in the same period (1891) (1892) (1893) (1894) (1895) (1896) (1897) (1898) (1899) (1900) (1901) (1902) (1903) (1904) (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) . But why did the government not increase the tariff up to the optimum level? The thesis argues that the government was constrained in three levels: (1) Internationally: the Federal government may have feared international retaliation (especially from consuming countries) from such a tax policy; (2) Regionally: the competition among the three government entities (Para and Amazonas States and Acre Territory) for tax revenues generated a suboptimal outcome; (3) Locally: pressure from business groups might have constrained the ability of the government to increase the export tax on rubber even more.
Overall, the thesis supports the view of Frank and Musacchio that there was no economic imperialism in the Amazon as the rubber chain does not fit into the model of "peripherality" of raw material and centrality of manufacture. This traditional formulation is at the heart of the GCC approach which suggests that production in the periphery (Brazil) should have developed in tandem with impulses emanating from the industrial core (U.S.A. and Europe). That pattern would ensure that profits in the periphery would either be held down (so as to maximize profits at the industrial core) or be high in order to ensure profitability from investments flowing from the industrial core. It is not surprising that for a quite long period, given the high inelasticity of demand for Brazilian rubber, manufacturers in the core economies were tied to developments occurring within the Brazilian Amazon, diametrically contrary to the traditional assumption of economic imperialism and to that embedded in the GCC approach. However, contrary to Frank and Musacchio, the thesis shows that imperialism cannot be completely dismissed though as the government (as well as all other agents in the rubber chain) was sometimes constrained by foreign pressures.
From taxation, the Amazonian State governments accumulated considerable wealth that was partly redistributed back to the region in the form of investments and subsidies. These funds were instrumental in developing two rubber-supporting activities, telegraphs and steamships, whose impacts on the chain were analyzed in this thesis. Interestingly, rubber had fostered the development of submarine telegraphs, for low rubber grades were used to insulate copper. Furthermore, rubber was also important in the improvement of the efficiency of steam engines insofar as this raw material was sometimes used as seals. Steam navigation and telegraphs gave rise to the rubber boom which, in turn, supported yet more the development of the (steam) navigation and the telegraphic system. The rubber boom demanded a better communication and transport systems, and the consequent increased intensity in the flow of people and merchandises provided these systems with economies of scale that ensured their ulterior development. The spread of news and the improvement in the transport system also provided the region with the scarcest factor of production, labor, and, as shown here, the Brazilian rubber supply was very inelastic to this factor of production. Furthermore, the advent of steamship navigation in the Amazon region displaced canoes, releasing even more laborers to work in the rubber industry. Thus, communication and (steam) navigation generated some integration, and the consequent movement of people (and other factors of production) and flow of information created the conditions for further development of the rubber boom by supporting a virtuous cycle. In sum, without rubber, steamships might have been even more costly to operate and the submarine telegraphic system may have never developed. Analogously, without steamships and telegraphic communication, the rubber boom might have never taken place.
As stated in the first paragraph of this note, the thesis makes several distinct contributions. First, the thesis constructs a new theoretical framework that was applied to the study of the rubber chain and which can be adapted for other commodity chains too. The analysis spans two levels: interactions among agents located within the same node of the chain and between agents located in different nodes. Whereas in the within-node analysis competition was the predominant topic of discussion, in the between-node analysis, game theory was applied in order to model bargaining power. Such analysis offers the most comprehensive study on the rubber chain ever produced, examining the rubber chain from tappers to manufacturers. Analytically, the thesis combines trade models with institutions, economic geography, and econometrics, providing a new view on the organization and evolution of the rubber trade from 1870 to 1910. It is argued that institutions shaped the development of the rubber boom and permeated each and every node of the rubber chain. Although the thesis shows that the framework can be fully applied to commodity chains, a word of caution is needed: the framework assumes a partial equilibrium approach and sometimes some connections between different markets may be missing. However, the thesis retains the basic properties and features of the rubber chain. Its validity is indeed corroborated by qualitative and quantitative historical evidences and data.
Secondly, the thesis contributes to global economic history. Rubber was an important raw material whose industrial applications increased over time. This raw material is indeed at the heart of two important technological developments of the industrial world, steam engine and motorcars, as rubber provided performance gains for both products. Before the advent of large-scale plantations, rubber was a very scarce raw material for which there were virtually no substitutes available: its natural elasticity rendered the product unique. Consequently, scarcity and poor substitutability made demand very price-inelastic. That is exactly one of the main features of the story here. Inelasticity of demand drove production methods to be rubber-saving. The scarcer this raw material was, the more incentives agents had to innovate: no wonder why the U.S.A. led the world in reclaimed rubber, first, and in synthetic rubber later. Therefore, the thesis explains the development of the rubber manufacturing industry in the U.S.A. and Britain. The need to secure a steady and reliable source of crude rubber explained how competition resounded along the chain, giving rise to a specific pattern of trade. As the thesis shows, this pattern of trade was yet shaped by institutions and economic geography. Furthermore, the inelasticity of demand for rubber shifted power between nodes of the chain. Indeed, the Wallersteinian preeminence of manufacturing over extractive industries is not valid here. Due to a combination of quantity and quality, rubber traders located in the Brazilian Amazon are likely to have possessed the highest degree of market power, allowing them to ultimately influence rubber manufacturing and not the other way around. Even if it is believed that these agents did not exercise this market power, for whatever reasons, the governments of the Amazonian States certainly profited substantially from the monopolistic position of the region on the world rubber markets. The rubber chain thus shows an interesting case in which taxation was beneficial for the region as a whole without generating immiserizing growth.
Thirdly, the thesis contributes to Brazilian economic historiography. The rubber chain in the Brazilian Amazon is not analyzed in vacuum as economic and political connections with other parts of the country were taken into account. These interactions produced a skewed insertion of the Brazilian Amazon into the world economy. In comparative terms, despite geographical proximity, the region strengthened its ties with Britain in detriment to the U.S.A. Deeper domestic integration was also a reality during the rubber boom. Hence, capital, people, goods, and information were exchanged between the Amazon and the rest of Brazil and between the Brazilian Amazon and the rest of the world. Internationally, two places figured prominently: Britain and the U.S.A. Domestically, Ceará (and other Northeastern States), from where most of the immigration originated, and Rio de Janeiro, the political capital during the period, stood out. The relationship with Rio de Janeiro was explored in detail. During the empire, the Amazon region lacked autonomy, being thus dependent on Rio de Janeiro. After the Proclamation of the Republic, with the consequent adoption of the Federalist regime, the region was granted more political and economic autonomy. This autonomy was indeed exercised by Amazonian governments via taxation on exports.
Lastly, the thesis fills a big gap in the economic historiography of the Brazilian Amazon. As is clear from the thesis, there are very few contributions on the economic history of the Brazilian Amazon. Given the importance of rubber, not least due to its impacts on trade and foreign exchange, it is surprising that the literature is so disproportionately poor compared to the literature produced for coffee in the Brazilian Southeast. As shown here, one topic of discussion fits prominently: labor relations. The thesis provides a game theoretic approach that changes the long-established view about labor relations in the Brazilian Amazon. It is shown that contrary to the existing literature, violence and coercion were not necessary features of rubber production. Production could have been assured via market mechanisms that were shown to have been more prevalent than what the literature believed or assumed.
The thesis goes beyond labor relations. Not only does it provide a more comprehensive account of the rubber boom (as existing works had also attempted) but it also links rubber supply and demand. The thesis thus analyzes the impulses of demand, especially the motorcar industry. It shows that demand became more price-inelastic over time, increasing the room of maneuver of agents placed in the Brazilian Amazon. Again, inelasticity is the main feature in the story here. Indeed, due to inelasticity, there was scope for taxation to increase the regional welfare. The thesis thus provides a welfare analysis that shows how much the region profited from taxation and how much it could have profited had the government set the tariff at the optimum level. Clearly, there were winners and losers, but overall, the region profited from rubber taxation as rubber consumers paid most of the taxation burden. This gives further support for the absence of imperialism in the Brazilian Amazon, even though the government's ability to tax was limited to some extent. Moreover, the thesis provides an in-teresting case study that unveils the behavior of an important British rubber trader (Schroder) and the connection with its main supplier located in the Brazilian Amazon (J.H.Andresen). It is argued that the relationship between these two companies resembled a usual trade relationship, but if any company possessed market power over another, it was probably the Brazilian/Portuguese export house. Once more, there is further indication that economic imperialism does not fit neatly into the picture here.
In order to support all these claims and findings, an extensive dataset was collected and organized. New evidence presented in this thesis is based on data organized in the Appendix. An entirely new dataset for the rubber trade was compiled from British, U.S., and French import data. It contains quantities, values, and prices of crude rubber imported not only from Brazil but also from all other sources of supply. A more detailed price dataset was constructed from contemporary publications reflecting market quotations for the main rubber grades. As can be inferred from the Appendix, Brazilian official statistics seemed to have underestimated the quantities a great deal as these three countries have imported more rubber from Brazil than total Brazilian official statistics suggest. This difference is even more striking if it is taken into account that rubber would probably still lose some weight in transit. The advantage of Brazilian official statistics is that it breaks the data down by administrative units: Pará, Amazonas, and Acre. Trade statistics can then be matched with export tax earnings to generate ad valorem export taxes at the State/Provincial level. Brazilian official statistics also provided rubber production data on a more detailed level for lower administrative units (by villages or rivers). It is possible then to combine this very detailed rubber trade data with information on freights. Extensive data on freight rates for rubber are provided, encompassing different methods of transportation (for instance canoes) and several different routes. This vibrant trade was accompanied and sustained by a communication network for which postal and telegraphic communication data were compiled. Moreover, the thesis further provides data on rubber manufacturing, wages in the Brazilian Amazon, investments in the region, etc.
Therefore, the thesis advances in several fronts the current historiography. Yet, there are several improvements that can be made. First, in view of the findings here, the business history of tire companies (and of rubber companies in general) needs to be revisited and augmented by including French and German rubber manufacturers too. This revision is required in order to explore the rubber famine these companies experienced. Their relationship with rubber traders requires further work as well, especially regarding the share of the market that was spot and how much was actually channeled, on a yearly basis, through for-ward contracts. More case studies on the rubber trade are needed so that it is possible to make more general statements about the relationship between traders located in producing and consuming countries. In particular, it is necessary to know more about the behavior of rubber exporters placed in Brazil. Were they monopolists and monopsonists? Were they only monopolists or monopsonists? Or neither of the above? I believe they were neither of the above, but more information on their behavior is needed to establish this on a more solid basis. In order to fully determine the impact of communication networks (notably shipping and telegraphs) on the rubber trade, more data are required. It would thus allow a more quantitative assessment of domestic and international market integration as well as an analysis of social savings for the Brazilian Amazon. Finally, the interactions between the Brazilian Amazon and the rest of Brazil need deeper analysis too, notably regarding the relationship with the coffee-producing areas in Southeast Brazil. Here, a computable general equilibrium model could shed more light on how these two booming regions interacted during the period 1870-1910. For instance, the thesis shows that taxation was certainly beneficial for the Amazonian region, but was it good for Brazil as a whole? Furthermore, how did the exchange market clear in a context of two separate markets that barely interacted with each other? These are the sort of questions that could be addressed by building up such model. For now, it is only possible to speculate that Brazil was far from an immense archipelago of separate economic islands as portrayed by Celso Furtado.
